创新博弈中政府与企业的互动演化均衡

创新对提高企业的竞争力,促进社会进步和经济发展具有十分重要的意义。由于创新的风险和不确定性,使得创新在很大程度上取决于创新主体——政府和企业的行为。本文以进化博弈的复制动态方法为工具,构建了创新进化博弈模型,分析了在创新过程中,政府与企业的策略互动及其均衡。本文证明:政府的有效激励会促使企业选择创新,而企业的创新热情将促进政府建立和完善创新激励机制,博弈的进化均衡是政府从制度上确保降低企业创新的外部成本以激励企业进行创新,企业则选择持续创新以追逐创新收益。     

既有建筑节能改造市场发展协同激励有效性评价

既有建筑节能改造市场是我国节能服务产业的重要组成部分,更是绿色建筑行动中的关键和困难环节。基于协同视域,从激励体系有效性和激励实施有效性双维度出发,考虑激励要素协同、激励过程协同、市场供需主体协同意愿等因素,构建协同激励有效性评价指标体系。分析指标间相互影响关系,运用ANP法确定指标权重,构建多级模糊综合评价模型,通过实证结果分析,为政府优化整合激励资源、促进市场整体发展提供对策。     

农村集体建设用地流转地权的激励模式

农村集体建设用地流转中存在严重的资金时差悖论,导致难以利用集体土地本身进行融资,土地整理融资难反过来又成为阻碍集体建设用地流转的瓶颈性因素。现有流转模式难以协调各种利益,不能对流转各方产生足够激励,变相征地的方式削弱了农民的土地持续收益能力,未能真正实现城乡建设用地"同质、同价、同权"。因此,应根据利益协调的原则创新制度设计,以地权激励引导社会资源投入,促进集体建设用地顺畅流转。     

China's health care reform: A tentative assessment

China has recently unveiled an ambitious new health-care reform plan, entailing a doubling of government health spending as well as a number of concrete reforms. While the details of the plan have not yet been completely announced, we offer a preliminary assessment of how well the reform is likely to achieve its stated goal of assuring every citizen equal access to affordable basic health care. The reform is based on three fundamental tenets: strong role of government in health, commitment to equity, and willingness to experiment with regulated market approaches. Within this framework, the reform offers a number of laudable changes to the health system, including an increase in public health financing, an expansion of primary health facilities and an increase in subsidies to achieve universal insurance coverage. However, it fails to address the root causes of the wastes and inefficiencies plaguing China's health care system, such as a fragmented delivery system and provider incentives to over-provide expensive tests and services. We conclude that China should consider changing the provider payment method from fee-for-service to a prospective payment method such as DRG or capitation with pay-for-performance, and to develop purchasing agencies that represent the interests of the population so as to enhance competition.     

Taking stock: A comparative analysis of payments for environmental services programs in developed and developing countries

Payments for environmental services (PES) are an innovative approach to conservation that has been applied increasingly often in both developed and developing countries. To date, however, few efforts have been made to systematically compare PES experiences. Drawing on the wealth of case studies in this Special Issue, we synthesize the information presented, according to case characteristics with respect to design, costs, environmental effectiveness, and other outcomes. PES programs often differ substantially one from the other. Some of the differences reflect adaptation of the basic concept to very different ecological, socioeconomic, or institutional conditions; others reflect poor design, due either to mistakes or to the need to accommodate political pressures. We find significant differences between user-financed PES programs, in which funding comes from the users of the ES being provided, and government-financed programs, in which funding comes from a third party. The user-financed programs in our sample were better targeted, more closely tailored to local conditions and needs, had better monitoring and a greater willingness to enforce conditionality, and had far fewer confounding side objectives than government-financed programs. We finish by outlining some perspectives on how both user- and government-financed PES programs could be made more effective and cost-efficient.     

联合确定基数合约:对魏茨曼模型的一个改进

本文针对国内外委托代理理论主要局限于理论分析层面而实用性不强的特点,在概要评论有关利润基数确定的相关文献的基础上,通过对美国一家公司委托代理实际案例的研究,提出了旨在能够解决实际委托代理关系的"联合确定基数法"。文章分析了联合确定基数法与棘轮效应模型的区别和联系,以数学方法论证了联合确定基数法的若干命题,描述了公司利润基数确定的利益诱导机制,并对比分析了联合确定基数法与西方教科书中的"激励设计模型"。本文试图以联合确定基数法为核心内容的一次性动态模型,代替蕴含着讨价还价过程的多次性动态模型。     

我国民营企业公司治理问题探讨

在我国,民营企业具有很强的发展潜力和竞争能力,对中国的经济增长发挥着举足轻重的作用。然而,我国民营企业公司治理方面存在多方面的问题,如企业治理机制不完善、公司治理家族化等。民营企业如何加强对自身的建设和治理,是实施国际化经营的基础和核心。     

A two-dimensional problem of revenue maximization

We consider the problem of finding the mechanism that maximizes the revenue of a seller of multiple objects. This problem turns out to be significantly more complex than the case where there is only a single object (which was solved by Myerson, 1981). The analysis is difficult even in the simplest case studied here, where there are two exclusive objects and a single buyer, with valuations uniformly distributed on triangular domains. We show that the optimal mechanisms are piecewise linear with either 2 or 3 pieces, and obtain explicit formulas for most cases of interest.     

价值工程应用中的激励、信息与博弈结构

本文认为激励和信息是影响价值工程应用的两个根本性制度因素。同时,本文从博弈结构角度分别分析了这两个因素影响价值工程的内在机制和对策。     

我国可再生能源经济激励政策回顾与建议

经济激励政策是市场经济环境下推动可再生能源卢业实现商业化、产业化、规模化发展的最关键、最有效的政策手段.本文回顾了我国实施可再生能源产业经济激励政策的实践,在分析其存在的问题和完善机遇的基础上,提出了具体政策建议.