Flypaper Effect and Sluggishness: Evidence from Regional Health Expenditure in Italy

In Italy, public expenditure reduction is achieved through a revision of social security and health care programs. In particular, public health expenditure control has been implemented through a reform that imposes more stringent budget rules to local governments and a considerable reduction in grants-in-aid from the central government. This paper investigates empirically whether the response to this decrease in categorical lump-sum grants from the central to local governments results in an asymmetric response to intergovernmental grants. Hard budget and soft budget constraint hypotheses are estimated by using a sample of cross-sectional and time observations covering the 20 Italian regions over the period 1989–1993. The main finding is the existence of a standard and a super flypaper effect in both models. The introduction of the soft-budget constraint hypothesis results in a stronger effect of grants and a lower response of own resources which shows that local governments prefer to incur some deficit instead of reducing health care expenditure.     

地方竞争是否阻碍了地方政府债务绩效的提升？——理论框架及空间计量研究

本文从举债行为策略视角考察地方竞争对地方政府债务绩效的影响。 首先,从不同地区间举债行为策略互动的视角对地方竞争如何影响地方政府债务绩效进行理论诠释,其次,在采用Global超效率DEA方法测度地方政府债务绩效的基础上,突破空间独立性假设,运用空间杜宾模型对地方竞争影响地方政府债务绩效的效果及空间外溢性进行实证检验。研究发现,在地方效用最大化目标导向下,无论是地方税收竞争还是公共投资竞争,都对债务增速产生了较为显著的正向影响和空间外溢效应,导致地方采取主动扩大债务规模的举债行为策略。与此同时,随着债务规模的持续增长,无论是地方税收竞争还是公共投资竞争,都将对债务绩效产生“规模报酬递减”的负向影响和空间外溢效应,尤其是公共投资竞争的影响效果更加明显。进一步地,如果考虑到可能存在预算软约束现象,地方竞争还将与预算软约束行为相结合,对债务绩效产生了“使用效率递减”的负向影响。本文结论为通过债务合理使用来促进经济高质量发展,防范化解地方政府债务风险提供了政策启示。     

地方公共债务与资本回报率——来自新口径债务数据和三重机制检验的经验证据

资本回报率对于理解我国经济运行具有重要意义。本文通过匹配2006-2015年地级市层面的新口径债务数据和资本回报率数据,实证检验了地方公共债务扩张对资本回报率的影响效应及其地区异质性表现,并从宏观、中观和微观三个角度开展作用机制分析。研究发现:第一,地方公共债务扩张对我国宏观资本回报率产生了负面影响,此影响在经过一系列稳健性检验后依然存在;第二,地方公共债务的扩张通过降低基础设施投资效率、提高房地产业投资占比和挤出企业投资产生影响;第三,上述负面影响在非城市群、非大中城市和土地融资依赖度更高的城市表现更为突出。以上结论为深化地方政府投融资体制改革提供了政策参考,未来应注重债务资金的绩效管理和使用效率,促进经济高质量发展。     

地区竞争、支出责任下移与地方政府债务扩张

地方政府债务过度扩张容易引发系统性经济风险。本文通过一个地方政府举债行为理论模型,分析了政府间共同事权的支出责任下移、竞争性地区的举债行为对地方政府债务规模的影响。在此基础上构建空间面板计量模型,利用279个地级市数据进行回归分析,结果表明:地方政府债务扩张是支出责任下移与标尺竞争机制共同驱动的结果;政府间支出责任下移造成的财政压力是地方政府被动负债的重要原因;地方政府间的标尺竞争使其在举债融资行为上表现为明显的策略模仿;各地区在债务扩张的主因上存在异质性,东部地区政府债务的增加主要是地区间竞争的结果。这意味着化解地方政府债务风险不仅应规范政府间财政支出责任划分,更重要的是完善地方政府的政绩考核体系和违规举债的问责机制。     

Strategic provision of local public inputs for oligopolistic firms in the presence of endogenous location choice

We develop a model in which two regional governments compete for a mobile oligopolistic firm by providing local public inputs. The central mechanism of our model is the interaction of an agglomeration advantage (partial nonrivalness of the local public inputs) and an agglomeration disadvantage (costs associated with the change of location of firms). We show that a central government of both regions induces an interregionally optimal allocation of firms by providing the optimal levels of local public inputs. The decentralized provision of local public inputs by regional governments, however, leads in most cases to a (interregionally) suboptimal allocation.     

从供给视角看我国房地产市场的“两难困境”

本文通过理论模型解释我国房地产市场两难困境的内在机制,提出各参与主体的博弈行为与房地产泡沫的制度逻辑:一方面地方政府土地出让和开发商的垄断造成房价过高;另一方面地方政府投资又依赖于土地出让收入。中央政府面临两者之间的权衡。本文提出,地方政府的利益是地价和房价上涨的根本原因,开发商垄断是高地价和高房价的直接原因。我们认为,大力建设保障性住房,并发展高端房市场是解决房地产市场两难处境的有效手段。     

土地价格、土地财政与宏观经济波动

本文在一个包含金融加速器的新凯恩斯动态一般均衡模型中引入土地财政和政府隐性担保融资机制,借此考察在土地财政体制下土地价格的波动特征、驱动因素和对宏观经济的影响机制,同时使用2004Q1到2016Q1的中国宏观经济数据对模型进行贝叶斯估计。方差分解的结果表明,在样本期间,土地需求冲击、土地供给冲击和货币政策冲击是驱动中国土地价格变动的主要因素,货币政策冲击和土地供给冲击是引起短期土地价格波动的主要因素,土地需求冲击在长期中驱动了土地价格波动。数值模拟结果发现,土地财政对宏观经济波动具有放大效应,正向的土地需求冲击将推高土地价格,并通过抵押约束机制引起宏观经济波动,地方政府对土地财政的依赖将放大该效应,并进一步对土地价格形成正向反馈,从而引起宏观经济更大的波动;在土地财政体制下,正向的土地供给冲击有助于抑制土地价格上涨,并减少宏观经济波动。     

The Politics of Russian Enterprise Reform: Insiders, Local Governments, and the Obstacles to Restructuring

Russia and other countries in the Commonwealth of IndependentStates that have implemented voucher privatization programshave to account for the puzzling behavior of insiders—manager-owners—who,in stripping assets from the firms they own, appear to be stealingfrom one pocket to fill the other. This article suggests thatasset stripping and the absence of restructuring result frominteractions between insiders and subnational governments ina particular property rights regime, in which the ability torealize value is limited by uncertainty and illiquidity. Asthe central institutions that govern the Russian economy haveceded their powers to the provinces, regional and local governmentshave imposed a variety of distortions on enterprises to protectlocal employment. To disentangle these vicious circles of control, this articlesconsiders three sets of institutional changes:; adjustmentsto the system of fiscal federalism by which subnational governmentswould be allowed to retain tax revenues generated locally; legalimprovements in the protection of property rights; and the provisionof mechanisms for restructuring and ownership transformationin insider-dominated firms. The aim of these reforms would beto change the incentives that local governments, owners, andinvestors face; to convince subnational governments that a moresustainable way of protecting employment lies in protectinglocal investment; to raise the cost of theft and corruptionby insiders and local officials; and to allow investors to acquirecontrolling stakes in viable firms.      

经济增长目标驱动投资吗?——基于2001-2016年地级市样本的理论分析与实证检验

已有文献发现政府制定的经济目标能够产生经济增长绩效,本文考察政府目标实现经济增长绩效的渠道和机制,提出经济增长目标驱动辖区投资增长的理论假说,并采用2001-2016年地级市政府工作报告公布的经济增长目标数据,对理论假说进行了验证。研究发现,经济增长目标每提高1%,地区投资显著上升约0.44%。这一发现在采用不同的核心变量度量指标、回归样本和估计方法后依然稳健。本文还发现,经济发展阶段和地区发展水平差异导致了目标驱动投资效应的异质性。随着经济发展阶段的转变,经济增长目标推动辖区投资增加的边际效应下降;在经济发展水平较高的东部地区,地方政府所制定的增长目标更有效地扩大了辖区投资。本文的研究发现有助于理解中国经济增长的内在动力机制,可为经济高质量发展转型提供政策启示。     

税费替代:增值税减税、非税收入征管与企业投资

通过减税促进企业投资和提振宏观经济是近年来中国税收制度改革的重要目标,但减税政策的实际效果却存在争议。本文利用2009年增值税转型改革,研究了减税对地方政府税费收入和企业非税负担的影响,从税费替代的角度揭示非税负担变动如何影响企业固定资产投资。研究发现:(1)增值税转型在减税的同时提高了地方政府非税收入并加重了企业非税负担,地方财政收入受增值税转型冲击越大,企业非税负担上升越明显。(2)上述应主要体现在小型、微型和民营企业上,大中型、非民营企业的非税负担未发生明显变化。(3)非税负担上升会显著抑制小型、微型和民营企业的固定资产投资,促使小型微型和民营企业通过持有更多现金和减少流动性负债来应对税费负担不确定性。本文有助于理解减税政策对小型微型和民营企业非税负担的溢出效应及其影响,为通过减税降费促进投资和提振经济提供经验支撑。     

Taxation without representation: local fiscal response to intergovernmental transfers in China

This paper studies the effects of intergovernmental transfers on local public spending in China, an authoritarian country where local politicians are not largely accountable to residents. The identification exploits a discontinuity from the central government’s designation of National Poor Counties. We find that additional transfers to county governments increase local public spending one-for-one. We further confirm that counties receiving additional transfers do not reduce the effective tax burden borne by firms. The results echo the empirical anomaly of the flypaper effect found in developed economies under democratic governments.     

Incremental Reform and Distortions in China's Product and Factor Markets

The purpose of economic reform is to reduce distortions andenhance efficiency. However, when reforms are partial and incremental,individuals and local governments are often able to capturethe rent inherent in the gradual transition process. Young (2000)warned that such rent-seeking behavior might lead to increasingmarket fragmentation. Empirical studies have shown the oppositein the product market. This article argues that as the rentfrom China's product market has been squeezed out due to deepeningreforms, rent-seeking behavior may have shifted to the capitalmarket. Further reforms are needed in the capital market tosqueeze out these rent-seeking opportunities, just as thosefrom the product and labor markets were squeezed out earlier.     

地方政府债券的经济影响分析

地方政府债券的发行对经济的影响涉及宏观、微观、金融、财政、区域发展等多个层面.其在缓解地方财政困难的同时也可能助长地方政府负债冲动,对中央财政的影响则取决于地方政府自身的偿付能力及发债规模的控制.在微观层面.地方政府债券的发行会促进地方性公共品的供给,同时也有利于实现公共品受益的代际公平;在宏观层面,有助于克服利用外资的本币化倾向,规避汇率风险问题.此外,地方政府债券的推出也有助于完善金融市场和金融体系,其对区域经济发展的影响取决于发债地区的选择标准.在推出地方债券的同时,必须通过审慎的管理来防范其风险.     

论公共卫生最优支出策略

公共卫生支出具有极强的正外部性.如果由地方政府或私人选择公共卫生支出的水平,那么他们的最优选择是较低的公共卫生支出和较高的个人消费(内含个人医疗支出),整个社会的福利将会处于较低的水平状态.本文在一个动态的框架下分析了发生这种现象的经济学原因,说明中央政府而非地方政府或私人应该对公共卫生的建设承担更大的责任,应由中央政府负责全国公共卫生体系的建设.     

中国政府间财政关系改革:地方视角

1994年的分税制改革,初步理顺了中央与各省级政府间的财政关系。体制运行十余年来,在取得巨大成效的背景下,暴露出以基层财政困难、地区间公共服务水平差异显著等为典型的现实问题。从地方视角而言,应以增强地方政府公共服务能力和均衡地方公共服务水平为基本出发点,逐步建立收入划分与支出划分相匹配的政府间财政关系安排。     

公共品单向外溢下地方政府间演化博弈——以跨区域水资源生态补偿为例

水资源作为典型的公共品具有很强的外溢性,而且其外溢性具有单向流动的特征,围绕水资源生态补偿引发的流域上下游地方政府间矛盾日益突显.基于演化博弈理论,分析我国跨区域上下游地方政府的博弈过程以及影响因素.研究表明,流域上下游地方政府达成合作的局面长期内主要受上游地方政府惩罚值、下游地方政府惩罚值、下游地方政府对上游地方政府的补偿收益以及上游地方政府保护水资源的成本等四个方面因素影响,而与下游地方政府因水资源受到保护而获得生态收益无关.高层级政府解决水资源补偿问题时,不能仅考虑下游地方政府获得生态收益,而应该综合考虑上游地方政府惩罚值、下游地方政府惩罚值、下游地方政府对上游地方政府的补偿收益以及上游地方政府保护水资源的成本等多方面因素.     

Fiscal Reconstruction and Local Government Financing

This paper investigates the dynamic properties of intergovernmental financing during a fiscal reconstruction process by analyzing the dynamic game among local governments, which operates with soft budget constraints because of concessionary region-specific transfers from a central government. The existence of intergovernmental transfers induces the free-riding behavior of local governments, thereby bringing considerable deficits to the central government. Raising local and/or national taxes is desirable for fiscal reconstruction, but is unable to attain the Pareto-efficient fiscal reconstruction. Taxes on lobbying activities, combined with uniform transfers, induce earlier concession and can attain the Pareto-efficient outcome in the long run.     

中部地区地方政府支农实证分析

本文从中部地区基层地方政府财政收入来源、财政支出结构、财政支出影响因素角度,分析了当前中部地区财政支持新农村建设的问题。结果表明,中部地区基层政府财政收入较多的依赖中央政府的转移支付,其支出受制度安排影响,缺乏财政决策权;财政支出类别繁多,资金利用效率不高;基层政府教育负担过重;回归分析表明,增加基层政府本级财政收入,能显著增加基层财政的农业投入和教育投入。本文提出,合理界定各级政府的事权,合理划分税权,加强基层财政资金的监督和管理,将有助于中部地区地方政府充分发挥在新农村建设中的重要作用。     

Size, spillovers and soft budget constraints

There is much evidence against the so-called “too big to fail” hypothesis in the case of bailouts to subnational governments. We look at a model where districts of different size provide local public goods with positive spillovers. Matching grants of a central government can induce socially-efficient provision, but districts can still exploit the intervening central government by inducing direct financing. We show that the ability and willingness of a district to induce a bailout and district size are negatively correlated. Furthermore, we argue that these policies can be equilibrium strategies.     

财政自主权、财政支出结构与全要素生产率--来自230个地级市的检验北大核心

本文尝试将财政自主权、财政支出结构与经济效率联系,在我国财政分权理论框架下揭示地方财政自主权与技术进步之间的关系。在理论上,提出了"地方财政自主权越高,技术进步水平也越高,但随着经济性财政支出边际效率递减以及社会性财政支出的长期不足,财政自主权对技术进步的影响正在减弱"的命题假说。在实证上,以1999-2013年230个城市数据,采用工具变量法检验了财政自主权对城市全要素生产率的影响。实证结果表明:(1)城市财政自主权对城市全要素生产率影响较弱,主要是对TFP组成中的规模效率(SE)和技术进步(TP)产生了较为明显的正影响;(2)财政自主权越高的城市,越倾向于增加经济性财政支出比重,而对于社会性支出则更有动机展开"逐底竞争";(3)财政自主权对全要素生产率构成中的规模效率(SE)和技术进步(TP)的影响呈现出减弱的趋势;(4)城市财政自主权的提高可以显著改进微观企业层面的全要素生产率水平。