影响高管薪酬的因素探究——基于河北省上市公司数据的分析

近年来,关于高管薪酬的研究得到众多学者的重视,研究者从不同视角、以不同的方式对高管薪酬的合理区间进行了探究.本文在以往研究的基础上,通过建立回归模型,从高管持股比例、公司规模、公司业绩、国有持股比例四个方面分析了影响河北省上市公司高管薪酬的因素.研究发现,高管总薪酬水平只与企业规模存在显著的正相关关系,而与高管持股比例、公司业绩和国有持股比例存在显著的负相关关系.这说明河北省上市公司的薪酬激励制度的设计存在缺陷,应尽快设计更加完善的高管薪酬激励制度.     

国有控股公司高管薪酬激励与中小投资者利益保护

利用2007年我国国有控股公司数据,以中小股东利益保护为因变量,以高管现金薪酬、高管持股比例和在职消费为主要考察对象,并选取公司规模和股权制衡结构作为控制变量,检验在不同激励方式下高管薪酬与中小股东利益的相关性,结论表明:国有控股公司高管薪酬主要集中于现金薪酬和在职消费,对中小股东利益侵害较大,而高管持股则可以保护中小投资者利益.     

高管薪酬粘性形成机理研究:基于掏空视角

本文通过构建引入大股东掏空行为的委托代理模型,基于掏空视角探究高管薪酬粘性形成机理,并以2013-2017年沪深A股上市公司为样本进行实证检验,研究发现如下四点结论:(1)大股东实施掏空行为加剧了高管薪酬粘性特征,掏空程度越高,薪酬粘性特征越明显。(2)掏空程度对高管薪酬粘性的加剧作用因高管持股比例或大股东持股比例高低差异而产生突变,存在明显的门槛效应。(3)高管持股比例高于门槛值时,掏空程度对高管薪酬粘性的加剧作用更显著;反之高管持股比例较低时,则不明显。(4)大股东持股比例在门槛值以下,大股东掏空行为明显加剧了高管薪酬粘性特征;当大股东持股比例高于门槛值时,则不存在显著影响。     

公司高管薪酬内部影响因素的实证研究

我国高管薪酬自1998年来得到完整有效披露,对其数额研究发现一直保持持续上涨,这值得我们反思─我国薪酬规划的设计体制是否合理?公司高管薪酬的持续攀升到底受何种因素的影响?本文从企业内部因素出发,以广东省2013~2015年A股上市公司为研究对象,基于相关性分析和回归分析等实证的研究方法,论证了公司内部对高管薪酬可能的影响因素,以便分析结果提出对策。结果表明:高管薪酬随着企业业绩、营业收入、资产规模、人数规模的增加而表现出显著的上升趋势。据此提出了两点建议:第一,将薪酬与业绩挂钩,实现公司与高管的双赢;第二,完善薪酬结构,将短期与长期薪酬激励相结合。     

企业并购影响高管薪酬业绩敏感性吗?——基于中国国有上市公司的实证分析

本文以中国沪深股市2006-2010年间作为买方发生并购行为的362个国有上市公司为研究对象,分析了公司并购行为对高管薪酬与公司业绩的敏感度的影响。研究发现,公司资产回报率、市场回报率与公司高管薪酬显著正相关。说明并购前,高管薪酬与资产回报率以及市场回报率显著正相关,即高管薪酬与公司业绩敏感度较高。并购所增加的会计业绩和市场业绩与高管薪酬在10%的水平下显著负相关。可见,企业并购显著降低了高管薪酬与公司资产回报率以及市场回报率的业绩敏感度。并购规模无论是通过会计绩效还是市场绩效检验分析,都显著与高管薪酬正相关,说明高管薪酬与并购规模的扩大显著正相关。为进一步分析并购绩效是否会影响高管薪酬变动,本文采用差分模型分析了高管薪酬变化值与并购业绩变化值和并购规模变化的关系,研究发现,高管薪酬的变化与并购绩效无显著的相关关系,而与并购增加的公司规模显著正相关。     

高管薪酬与企业绩效的相关性研究——基于山东省上市公司的实证分析

本文选取沪A股山东省33家上市公司作为主要研究对象,对公司高管薪酬、高管持股比率和国家(国家法人)持股的整体情况进行了分析,分别从高管薪酬、薪酬差距和高管持股的角度研究了这些因素与企业绩效的相关性,考察了企业规模与高管薪酬以及平均薪酬的相关性.在目前的薪酬体系下,山东省上市公司高管薪酬逐年增长.整体看来,这些公司中国家...     

我国中小商业银行高管薪酬影响因素的实证分析

32家中国区域性中小商业银行的样本数据表明,股权结构集中度、外部大股东持股比例和董事会独立性对银行高管薪酬产生了显著的影响,而董事会与监事会规模、银行绩效与成长性都没有对高管薪酬产生影响.     

中国上市公司高管薪酬与公司业绩相关性实证研究

本文利用Eviews统计软件对上市公司数据进行分析。通过对高管薪酬与其他数据的相关性分析,得出高管薪酬与公司业绩,公司规模正相关,与高管持股比例负相关的结论。通过分析,我们发现高管薪酬对公司业绩有显著的影响。     

央企上市公司高管薪酬与分红、经营业绩的研究

文章基于央企上市公司高管薪酬改革的视角,选取2010~2014年我国央企上市公司及其控股子公司的数据,对高管薪酬与分红、经营业绩之间的关系进行实证研究。研究结果发现,央企上市公司的分红、高管持股比例以及企业规模对高管薪酬有正相关关系,其中企业分红对高管薪酬有着显著的正相关关系,经营业绩也在一定程度上影响着高管薪酬,对其有不显著的正相关关系。     

高管薪酬与公司业绩关系实证研究——基于我国中小企业板的实证研究

本文以583家中小企业板上市公司2007-2010年间的数据为样本,讨论并检验了高管薪酬与公司业绩之间的相关性。研究结果表明:无论最终控制人是国有法人还是非国有法人,中国中小企业上市公司的高管薪酬与公司业绩、公司规模之间都存在着显著的正相关关系;无论是国有控股还是非国有控股,高管持股比例均与高管薪酬显著正相关;在国有股控股的中小企业中,高管薪酬与股权集中度正相关,在非国有股控股的中小企业中,高管薪酬与股权集中度负相关;在国有控股的中小企业板上市公司中,公司的成长性与高管薪酬同步变化,而非国有控股的中小企业板上市公司的成长性与高管薪酬负相关。     

管理层权力与上市公司薪酬业绩敏感性的实证研究——来自国有上市公司的经验证据

本文在对国内外文献进行充分回顾的基础上,立足于中国资本市场的特殊制度背景,以国有上市公司为研究样本,检验了管理层权力对上市公司薪酬业绩敏感性的影响。在此基础上,本文利用回归模型对上市公司的业绩进行了分离,经验证据发现,在管理层权力的影响下,高管薪酬与上市公司非正常业绩之间存在显著的正相关关系,与此同时,高管薪酬与上市公司的正常业绩之间的相关性却明显减弱。     

管理层权力、高管人力资本激励与企业绩效

合理的高管人力资本激励机制是发挥高管人力资本效用进而提高企业绩效的有效途径。本文通过实证检验管理层权力、高管人力资本激励与企业绩效的关系,结果表明:高管货币薪酬与企业绩效显著正相关,与国有企业相比,非国有企业的相关性更明显;管理层权力削弱了高管货币薪酬对企业绩效的激励作用。国有企业的在职消费与企业绩效显著负相关,但非国有企业其二者之间的相关性并不显著;管理层权力加大了在职消费对企业绩效的负向影响。高管团队内部薪酬差距与企业绩效显著正相关,且非国有企业比国有企业的相关性更明显;管理层权力削弱了高管团队内部薪酬差距对企业绩效的激励作用。     

Cost behavior and executive bonus compensation

Prior literature provides compelling evidence of an asymmetric relation between executive bonus compensation and earnings performance. In particular, this literature reports that compensation committees assign greater weight to good (positive) earnings performance than poor (negative) earnings performance. Taken together, the prior literature provides strong support for critics who claim that compensation committees blindly protect executives from earnings underperformance. We further examine this issue by investigating whether a firm's cost behavior (i.e., the relation between expenses and sales) provides an explanation for the apparent inefficiency in executive compensation contracts. Our evidence suggests that executives are rewarded more for increases in ROA that arise from normal cost behavior than other increases in ROA consistent with these increases being perceived as more persistent. In contrast, we do not find such a relationship for decreases in ROA which suggests that executives are largely shielded from decreases in ROA that follow normal cost behavior. We examine two factors suggested by the prior literature, expected future sales and the extent of capacity utilization, which may provide an explanation for why executives are shielded from normal cost behavior decreases in ROA. When these additional factors are included in our empirical models, our evidence suggests that the asymmetric relation between changes in CEO bonus compensation and increases and decreases in earnings performance documented in prior literature goes away. That is, our results suggest that compensation committees do not blindly protect executives for earnings underperformance. On the contrary, our evidence suggests that these committees take into account other non-earnings information when deciding how much weight to give to a decrease in earnings and that executive compensation may not be as inefficient as suggested by prior research.     

高管薪酬与公司业绩实证研究——以中小企业板上市公司为例

选取2009年前上市的235家中小企业板上市公司2013年的年报数据,实证检验高管薪酬与公司业绩之间的相关性。结果表明：中小企业板上市公司高管薪酬与公司业绩、公司规模存在显著正相关关系,高管薪酬与资本结构之间存在显著负相关关系。     

公司社会声望与高管薪酬:公共服务抑或职业声誉

本文基于“隐性—显性”契约激励研究范式,探讨公司社会声望对高管薪酬的影响以及作用机制。本文选取2009—2017年间的非金融A股上市公司为样本,研究发现,拥有较高社会声望的公司,其高管显性薪酬较低。具体而言,公共地位较高的国有企业、具有较高市场声誉的民营上市公司,其高管薪酬平均而言分别比其他上市公司低4.97%和6.30%。进一步地,我们发现公司声望对我国高管显性薪酬契约存在两种作用机制:一方面,公共地位较高的国有企业,可以为高管带来较高的社会声誉和社会认可,满足了“公共服务”类高管的社会声望偏好,从而降低了显性薪酬的支付水平;另一方面,市场声誉较高的民营企业,可以为高管带来较高的职业声誉和未来职业利益,符合“以商为荣”类高管的社会声望偏好,使高管愿意接受较低的显性薪酬。本文的结论为公司声望作为一种有价值的资源,可以对高管显性薪酬形成议价能力提供了重要证据,揭示了公司声望对高管显性契约激励的影响路径;同时,为国有企业高管薪酬契约设计以及激励机制提供了一定启示。     

公司社会声望与高管薪酬:公共服务抑或职业声誉

本文基于“隐性—显性”契约激励研究范式,探讨公司社会声望对高管薪酬的影响以及作用机制。本文选取2009—2017年间的非金融A股上市公司为样本,研究发现,拥有较高社会声望的公司,其高管显性薪酬较低。具体而言,公共地位较高的国有企业、具有较高市场声誉的民营上市公司,其高管薪酬平均而言分别比其他上市公司低4.97%和6.30%。进一步地,我们发现公司声望对我国高管显性薪酬契约存在两种作用机制:一方面,公共地位较高的国有企业,可以为高管带来较高的社会声誉和社会认可,满足了“公共服务”类高管的社会声望偏好,从而降低了显性薪酬的支付水平;另一方面,市场声誉较高的民营企业,可以为高管带来较高的职业声誉和未来职业利益,符合“以商为荣”类高管的社会声望偏好,使高管愿意接受较低的显性薪酬。本文的结论为公司声望作为一种有价值的资源,可以对高管显性薪酬形成议价能力提供了重要证据,揭示了公司声望对高管显性契约激励的影响路径;同时,为国有企业高管薪酬契约设计以及激励机制提供了一定启示。     

Coaches or Speculators? The Role and Impact of Venture Capital on Executive Compensation in Chinese Listed Companies

In this paper, we utilize a panel dataset that covers 1245 listed companies which accomplished their IPO during 2006 to 2014 in China to investigate the impact of venture capital (VC) firms on executive compensation, equity incentive and pay-performance-sensitivity. We make several key findings: First, we find the presence of VCs can significantly raise the executive compensation. Second, high reputation VCs and private VCs increases the likelihood of granting executive equity incentives, whereas foreign VCs are significantly negatively related with executive equity incentive. Third, the pay-performance sensitivity of government VCs and foreign VCs is significant on stock return (RET) whereas insignificant on accounting performance (ROA). Moreover, the increasing VCs share in portfolio companies enhance the pay performance sensitivity on RET. Our results show that before VCs final exiting their post-IPO portfolio companies in China, VCs’ impact on executive compensation are more consistent with grandstanding theories and intending to provide higher cash compensation to encourage executives to raise the companies’ stock price, which is indicating VCs’ changing role from a coach into a speculator after the portfolio companies’ IPO.     

高管个人特征与公司税负

以我国上市公司1992～2009年的高管变更及高管个人特征数据为样本,实证分析公司高管个人特征与公司税负之间的关系。研究结果表明,公司高管的变更会显著影响公司税负的大小,且该影响发挥作用的时间具有一定的滞后性。公司高管的任期长短、专业背景等个人特征是影响公司税负的重要因素。     

Who should set CEO pay? The press? Congress? Shareholders?

Populist fervor in an election year has transformed executive compensation from a business issue into a political one. Critics, led by Graef Crystal, author of In Search of Excess: The Overcompensation of American Executives, charge that CEOs are ripping off shareholders with their outrageous salaries while running U.S. corporations into the ground. Politicians claim overpaid CEOs are the root cause of the U.S. competitiveness problem. Add a recessionary business climate to the fact that some CEOs earn 130 times more than their lowest paid employees, and you have the makings of a populist rebellion. In a bid to appease voters, Congress is considering several bills that would limit the deductibility of "excessive executive salaries," the SEC has opened the issue to shareholder comment, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board is looking at new accounting standards for granting stock options to executives as part of company compensation schemes. Andrew R. Brownstein and Morris J. Panner say it's time to put the debate back where it belongs--in a business context. The real question is not are executives paid too much, but are shareholders getting their money's worth. Most U.S. corporations use stock compensation to link company long-term performance to executive salaries. And because of the staggering market performance of U.S. corporations in the 1980s, an overwhelming majority of CEOs are actually paid in line with their performance. Rather than cut executive pay, Brownstein and Panner suggest that corporations extend incentive-based compensation plans to all employees, thus narrowing the salary gap and establishing pay for performance at every level of the organization.     

Pensions as a Form of Executive Compensation

This paper investigates the role of pensions as an element of total executive compensation, and the relationship between pensions and performance‐based compensation in executive pay. Using hand‐collected data on FTSE 100 CEOs and senior executives from 2004?2011, we document that pensions function as a substitute for performance‐based compensation (primarily bonuses) in both cross‐sectional and time‐series settings. We also examine the effect of corporate governance characteristics on executive pensions. We find that corporate governance characteristics associated with stronger board monitoring play a constraining role on the magnitude of pensions. Our evidence of substitution effects between pensions and performance‐based compensation is consistent with a managerial power view of executive compensation‐setting, and the use of pensions as a ‘stealth’ element of compensation. Our findings are robust to considering different types of pensions, product market competition, and cross‐listing. Sub‐period analysis shows that pensions decrease and substitution effects weaken following the 2008 financial crisis. Moreover, we find no evidence that the use of compensation consultants with potential conflicts of interest is associated with higher pensions. Overall, our study contributes to a greater understanding of the role of pensions in executive compensation, and shows the importance of including pensions in analysis of executive compensation.