信贷管制、隐性契约与贷款利率变相市场化——现象与解释

本文将视角聚焦于利率市场化改革之前,重点研究金融抑制对银企信贷契约的异化。研究发现,在金融抑制背景下银企之间存在以留存贷款为表现的隐性契约,用以帮助银行在满足管制要求的同时追求利润最大化。本文对这一现象进行了理论分析与实证检验,发现隐性契约的发生与否会随着货币政策、企业特征等因素的改变而有所差异,这在一定程度上起到了利率变相市场化的作用。进一步研究则发现,这一隐性契约对企业价值产生了负向影响。     

产业共性技术政府支持性研发外包合同影响因素研究

建立产业共性技术研发外包博弈模型，从政府视角研究以共性技术产出最大化为目标的最优政府支持性研发外包合同，并对最优外包合同影响因素进行分析。研究表明：足够多的政府预算是共性技术政府支持性最优研发外包合同存在的前提，最优合同条款随政府预算的增大而增多，企业保留收益增大倒逼政府预算增加；企业最优知识技术投入与共性技术价值系数以及从研发中分享的收益份额正相关，与政府支付的固定研发费用负相关；政府最优知识技术投入与固定研发费用及单位投入成本系数负相关；企业最优投入与政府投入成本系数负相关，与政府投入对研发成功的贡献系数正相关，且企业最优投入随其研发能力的增强而加大。最后，根据研究结论，从政府预算、项目前景及支持性资源分配3个方面提出共性技术研发外包合同实施的政策建议。     

Do development projects crowd-out private sector activities? Evidence from contract farming participation in Northern Ghana

Contract farming (CF) is attractive as a possible private sector-led strategy for improving market coordination and smallholder farmers’ welfare. At the same time, governmental and non-governmental development projects aimed at improving farmers’ welfare continue to be organized. It is not uncommon for CF activities and development projects to take place in the same communities. Yet so far there is no evidence on how development projects affect CF activities. We examine factors affecting entry in and exit from different maize CF schemes in Northern Ghana, and focus specifically on the role of development projects. We find that the presence of agricultural development projects in the community is associated with lower scheme entry, but this not the case for non-agricultural projects. CF exit is more strongly associated with maize projects, but not significantly with non-maize or non-agricultural projects. Thus, our findings do not support concerns of a general moral hazard problem arising from the presence of any development project, but indicate possible negative associations of more closely related agricultural or maize projects with maize CF participation.     

Customer concentration and loan contract terms

We study pricing and non-pricing features of loan contracts to gauge how the credit market evaluates a firm’s customer-base profile and supply-chain relations. Higher customer concentration increases interest rate spreads and the number of restrictive covenants featured in newly initiated as well as renegotiated bank loans. Customer concentration also abbreviates the maturity of those loans as well as the relationship between firms and their banks. These effects are intensified by customers’ financial distress, the level of relationship-specific investments, and the use of trade credit in customer–supplier relations. Our evidence shows that a deeper exposure to a small set of large customers bears negative consequences for a firm’s relations with its creditors, revealing limits to integration along the supply chain.     

Optimal insurance in the presence of reinsurance

This paper studies an optimal insurance and reinsurance design problem among three agents: policyholder, insurer, and reinsurer. We assume that the preferences of the parties are given by distortion risk measures, which are equivalent to dual utilities. By maximizing the dual utility of the insurer and jointly solving the optimal insurance and reinsurance contracts, it is found that a layering insurance is optimal, with every layer being borne by one of the three agents. We also show that reinsurance encourages more insurance, and is welfare improving for the economy. Furthermore, it is optimal for the insurer to charge the maximum acceptable insurance premium to the policyholder. This paper also considers three other variants of the optimal insurance/reinsurance models. The first two variants impose a limit on the reinsurance premium so as to prevent insurer to reinsure all its risk. An optimal solution is still layering insurance, though the insurer will have to retain higher risk. Finally, we study the effect of competition by permitting the policyholder to insure its risk with an insurer, a reinsurer, or both. The competition from the reinsurer dampens the price at which an insurer could charge to the policyholder, although the optimal indemnities remain the same as the baseline model. The reinsurer will however not trade with the policyholder in this optimal solution.     

金融审判中风险防范的适法困境与选择

金融资管业务往往通过民事合同的安排来达到降低交易成本、规避金融监管的目的。为了防范金融风险,金融监管机构通过《资管新规》等一系列监管政策加强对金融市场的"穿透式"监管。金融商事审判机关在制定法没有明确规定的情况下,如何针对违反监管政策的金融交易合同做出公允的裁判是亟须解决的问题。本文分析了合同法第53条3、4、5款的适用空间为何,以及金融商事审判如何在现行法的框架内防范实现风险防范的目的。     

Differentiating two types of learning in contract design: Evidence from the construction industry

This research investigates the learning of inter-organizational contract design in greater depth. Two types of learning, i.e. learning from all past partnerships and learning from one specific partner, are distinguished in terms of their influence on the complexity of three different functions of the contract, namely control, coordination, and adaptation. Contract design capability and interorganizational routines are employed as mediators to explain the two types of learning respectively. Empirical tests using data from the Chinese construction industry reveal that there are significant indirect effects between partner-specific experience and contractual coordination, and between general partnership experience and all the three functions of the contract. This research contributes to the literature by providing more nuanced conclusions regarding the contract learning issue.     

不完全合同理论视角下渐进性创新的逆向研发外包组织模式、技术溢出与创新能力研究

既有研发外包组织理论主要基于技术优势企业视角，关注如何治理技术溢出等交易成本，忽视了缺少专利和隐性知识的企业进行渐进性创新时最优研发外包组织选择。基于不完全合同视角，从企业对研发中激励代理方努力与降低渐进性创新的不完全替代性成本之间的权衡出发，分析委托方如何合作、并购、委托以及新建研发等组织最优选择。结果表明，当委托方技术水平较低时，最优组织将需要给代理方更多控制权以激励其努力，相反，委托方则保留更多控制权以降低不完全替代性成本。委托方市场规模通过影响代理方的私人收益降低不完全替代性成本，使得委托方愿意放弃控制权以激励代理方努力。新建研发可以看作是委托方通过承担更多时间和风险成本，从而降低不完全替代性成本。在不同组织形式中，委托方对研发投入的积极性是不同的，这决定了委托方通过研发外包获得的技术溢出效应和企业创新能力。     

Motivations to grow energy crops: the role of crop and contract attributes

Perennial energy crops are a promising source of bioenergy whose production involves production risks, long‐term commitment of land and need for crop‐specific investments without the coverage of crop insurance potentially available for conventional crops. We conduct a choice experiment in five states in the Midwestern and South‐central regions of the U.S. to examine the effect of crop‐contract attributes on the joint discrete‐continuous choice decisions to adopt an energy crop and convert acres to it from a status quo use, while controlling for the effect of various farmers’ risk and time preferences, sociodemographic characteristics, and availability of crop insurance for conventional crops. We find robust evidence that high discount rates, high upfront establishment costs and need for crop‐specific investments create disincentives for adoption and allocation of land to energy crop production. The effects of riskiness of returns and risk aversion are less robust across specifications. The effect of conventional crop insurance on the energy crop adoption decision differs across types of insurance; in particular, farmers with revenue insurance are statistically significantly less likely to adopt an energy crop. Our results have implications for the design of effective contracts and policy incentives to induce the production of energy crops.     

Estimating Technical Efficiency and Production Risk under Contract Farming: A Bayesian Estimation and Stochastic Dominance Methodology

We investigate production risk, technical efficiency and risk attitudes amongst contract and independent farmers. We use a Bayesian parametric approach and stochastic dominance quantile regression methods to compare technical efficiency and risk attitude of smallholders in Nepal. Using farm‐level data, we find that contract farmers appear to show lower inefficiency and lower production risk. Additionally, contract and independent farmers can increase output by reducing the scale of operation. Regardless of the commodity produced and farming arrangement (contract or independent production), we find that labour, land and other inputs are risk‐augmenting, while the role of capital is mixed. We find a second order stochastic dominance (SSD) for lentils, and first order stochastic dominance (FSD) for tomatoes, ginger and HYV paddy seed commodities. Finally, contract farmers are more risk averse than independent farmers, regardless of the commodity produced.