大股东资金占用和公司绩效：来自其他应收款的证据

在具体考察大股东资金占用的经济后果和制度成因时,首先发现其他应收款比重不仅对公司经营绩效（EPS和ROE）具有显著且较强的负面影响,还对公司盈利能力（盈利概率）具有显著且较强的负面影响。结果表明,大股东通过其他应收款账户对上市公司的占款行为会对上市公司的经营绩效和盈利能力造成不利影响,并会损害其他中小股东的利益以及公司长远发展的后劲。另外还发现,第一大股东持股对其他应收款比重具有显著较强的非线性影响：当第一大股东的控股地位较弱时,第一大股东具有较强的激励效应去改善公司绩效,并减少对上市公司资金的无效占用;当第一大股东的控股地位较强时,第一大股东具有较强的动机和能力去攫取私人利益,并增加对上市公司的资金占用。     

大股东资金占用对上市公司影响──基于阿继电器的案例分析

在中国资本市场中,许许多多的上市公司存在着大股东占用资金的问题.从相关统计来看,如果上市公司连续两年都为亏损状态,则超过70%的大股东都有着侵占资金的情况;而对于已经退市的上市公司而言,控股股东侵占资金的行为是其经营失败的根本原因.由此可见,大股东占款对上市企业乃至中国资本市场都有极大的负面影响.阿继电器为一家上市公司,其最大股东阿继集团的资金占用行为,对阿继电器的盈利能力、偿债能力以及财务报表具有很大影响,成为了阿继电器的沉重负担.     

高管薪酬粘性形成机理研究:基于掏空视角

本文通过构建引入大股东掏空行为的委托代理模型,基于掏空视角探究高管薪酬粘性形成机理,并以2013-2017年沪深A股上市公司为样本进行实证检验,研究发现如下四点结论:(1)大股东实施掏空行为加剧了高管薪酬粘性特征,掏空程度越高,薪酬粘性特征越明显。(2)掏空程度对高管薪酬粘性的加剧作用因高管持股比例或大股东持股比例高低差异而产生突变,存在明显的门槛效应。(3)高管持股比例高于门槛值时,掏空程度对高管薪酬粘性的加剧作用更显著;反之高管持股比例较低时,则不明显。(4)大股东持股比例在门槛值以下,大股东掏空行为明显加剧了高管薪酬粘性特征;当大股东持股比例高于门槛值时,则不存在显著影响。     

大股东占用上市公司资金的动因与治理

<正>根据证监会数据统计,截至2006年上半年,我国证券市场共有498家公司存在大股东占款问题,累计金额近509亿元,违规担保416亿元,关联方实际占用上市公司资金达925亿元。上市企业有近1/10的资金因此大量"流失",大股东占款成了我国证券市场最大的"出血口"。一直以来大股东占用上市公司的资金问题都被关注,但直到2006年才掀     

负债治理与大股东占款

以2002年至2007年深沪两市5950个研究样本,探讨负债的治理效应.研究发现,我国上市公司总资产负债率和短期资产负债率与大股东占款之间呈负相关关系.研究还发现,长期资产负债率与大股东占款回归系数为正,说明在我国现实国情下上市公司流动负债起到了抑制大股东占款的作用,而长期负债助长了大股东占款,长期负债成为大股东占款的工具.     

大股东掏空与盈余管理关系研究——基于掏空效应引入盈余管理模型视角

大股东与中小股东的利益冲突是现代企业发展过程中广泛存在的重要问题。本文基于委托代理问题与大股东掏空路径,选取2012－2019年A股上市公司数据,将大股东掏空效应引入Kothari et al.（2005）修正的Jones模型,计算应计盈余时剔除关联交易行为与资金占用的影响,比较剔除前后可操纵利润的差异,对大股东掏空与盈余管理的关系进行实证研究。鉴于大股东掏空本身对盈余管理模型计算有影响,本文的做法可以形象反映掏空对盈余管理的影响路径,即大股东通过实现关联交易和资金占用,导致可操纵应计利润减少,企业会通过其他手段进行盈余管理。另外,还考虑不同产权性质的影响,结果发现国企相对于非国企来说,以掩盖大股东掏空为动机进行应计盈余管理的动机更强。     

大股东股权质押同伴效应的异质性研究北大核心CSSCI

文章以2009-2019年1043家A股上市公司的数据验证行业、地区同伴效应对大股东股权质押的影响。研究发现:行业与地区同伴效应将正向影响大股东的股权质押行为,地区同伴的影响更大;融资约束与国有产权性质均会削弱股权质押的同伴效应,市场竞争则加剧了股权质押的同伴效应;另外,股权质押的同伴效应会损害上市公司的企业价值,加深大股东的掏空程度。     

“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据

本文以我国A股上市公司 2 0 0 0— 2 0 0 3年的关联交易数据为基础 ,对所有权结构与控股股东的掏空 (Tun neling)行为之间的关系进行了实证分析。结果表明 ,控股股东占用的上市公司资金与第一大股东持股比例之间存在先上升后下降的非线性关系 ,但与其他股东的持股比例则表现出严格的负相关关系。另外 ,控股股东的控制方式以及产权性质也对其资金占用行为具有重要影响。其中 ,通过控股公司控制上市公司的控股股东占用的资金低于通过企业集团控制的上市公司 ,国有企业控制的公司的控股股东占用的资金高于非国有企业控制的上市公司。     

上市公司大股东支持行为的影响因素研究

公司治理作为一种确定公司出资者与管理层及其他各方权利责任的制度性安排,大多基于Berle和Means所有权和控制权高度分离的观点。现实中大股东为了自身的利益,不仅可能没有起到监督管理者的作用,而且还可能侵占小股东的利益,大股东掏空上市公司的行为屡见不鲜。但是大股东也有支持上市公司的时候。当上市公司陷入财务困境时,     

融资融券、终极控制人两权分离与大股东掏空抑制

采用2010-2016年沪深两市A股上市公司数据,考察融资融券机制、终极控制人两权分离对大股东掏空行为的影响.研究发现:两权分离度越高,大股东掏空越严重.而融资融券抑制了终极控制人两权分离引起的大股东掏空.进一步分析发现:在投资者保护环境更差、信息披露质量较低、内部治理机制更差的公司中,融资融券的掏空治理效应更加明显.     

Family ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Western European corporations

This paper empirically examines how family-controlled firms perform in relation to firms with nonfamily controlling shareholders in Western Europe. The sample consists of 1672 non-financial firms. Active family control is associated with higher profitability compared to nonfamily firms, whereas passive family control does not affect profitability. Active family control continues to outperform nonfamily control in terms of profitability in different legal regimes. Active and passive family control is associated with higher firm valuations, but the premium is mainly due to economies with high shareholder protection. The benefits from family control occur in nonmajority held firms. These results suggest that family control lowers the agency problem between owners and managers, but gives rise to conflicts between the family and minority shareholders when shareholder protection is low and control is high.     

Shareholder litigation rights and ESG controversies: A quasi-natural experiment

Leveraging as a quasi-natural experiment the staggered passage of universal demand laws, which raise the difficulty of shareholder lawsuits, we examine the effect of shareholder litigation rights on ESG controversies. Our difference-in-differences estimates show that an exogenous decline in shareholder litigation risk results in a significant drop in ESG controversies. Specifically, ESG controversies fall by 40.85% in response to an exogenous reduction in litigation risk. When more insulated from shareholder litigation, managers prefer to live a quiet life, intentionally avoiding risky and contentious activities, which require more managerial time and effort. Additional analysis validates the results, including propensity score matching, entropy balancing, and Oster's (2019) testing of coefficient stability. Finally, we find that ESG controversies erode firm profitability considerably, consistent with the theoretical expectations.     

Does Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Create Shareholder Value? Evidence from the Indian Companies Act 2013

In 2013, a new law required Indian firms, which satisfy certain profitability, net worth, and size thresholds, to spend at least 2% of their net income on corporate social responsibility (CSR). We exploit this regulatory change to isolate the shareholder value implications of CSR activities. Using an event study approach coupled with a regression discontinuity design, we find that the law, on average, caused a 4.1% drop in the stock price of firms forced to spend money on CSR. However, firms that spend more on advertising are not negatively affected by the mandatory CSR rule. These results suggest that firms voluntarily choose CSR to maximize shareholder value. Therefore, forcing a firm to spend on CSR is likely to be sub‐optimal for the firm with a consequent negative impact on shareholder value.     

Impact of an accounting environment on cash flow prediction

This study investigates the impact of an accounting environment on the performance of cash flow prediction models. It is hypothesized that the cash flow model by Barth, Cram, and Nelson [Acc. Rev. 76 (2001) 27] performs well in countries where the accruals are used mainly to correct cash flows to better reflect current profitability of the firm, i.e., in countries with high information content of accruals. The results suggest that the model performs consistently across countries, except in Germany. As hypothesized, the impacts of the explanatory variables are similar in market-oriented countries with separated financial accounting and taxation, with strong shareholder protection and legislation based on common-law origin, i.e., in countries with high quality of accruals. By contrast, the impacts are different in countries with low quality of accruals. The results imply that the cash flow prediction model by Barth et al. [Acc. Rev. 76 (2001) 27] can be used in different kinds of accounting environments. However, the exact parameter values are dependent on the accounting environment.     

Nonnegotiable shares, controlling shareholders, and dividend payments in China

China has some unique institutional features. For example, the shares of listed firms are segmented into negotiable and nonnegotiable ones. The controlling shareholders, usually connected to the government, hold nonnegotiable shares. We examine how these institutional features affected cash dividend payments in China during the period 1994-2006. We find that dividend payments are positively associated with the proportion of nonnegotiable shares in a firm and the proportion of nonnegotiable shares held by the controlling shareholder; moreover, the 2001 China Securities Regulatory Commission stipulation requiring cash dividend payments does not benefit negotiable shareholders. However, we also find that dividend payments are downside flexible, and controlling shareholders cannot force firms to pay or to pay more dividends when firms' earnings decline significantly. The conventional factors, especially profitability or the capability to pay, still play an important role in determining the dividend policy. The propensity to pay and the payout ratio in China are not high compared to those of other countries.     

Understanding the Endogeneity Between Firm Value and Shareholder Rights

I explore the relation between firm value and the shareholder rights-based Governance Index "G," which has become a popular measure of governance quality among researchers and investors. I show that the relation is not spuriously driven by unobservable firm heterogeneity or an assortment of observable firm characteristics, such as firm growth potential and profitability. The causality seems to run from G to firm value, rather than from firm value to G. My results suggest that granting more rights to shareholders could be an effective way to reduce agency costs and enhance firm value.     

定向增发公司盈余管理研究

文章按照定向增发公司发行对象分组,分析了各组公司在发行前后共计11个季度的盈余管理情况。发现公司只对大股东发行股份时,发行前没有操纵利润,但发行后存在较强盈余管理;当机构投资者参与定向增发时,企业在发行前后都进行了盈余管理,发行后盈余管理的程度有所降低。机构投资者参与定向增发的程度越大,企业在增发过程中盈余管理的持续性和程度都越大。盈余管理的动机可能是为了保证企业承诺业绩的实现。     

Trading-off Corporate Control and Personal Diversification through Capital Structure and Merger Activity

Abstract:  In this study we use direct estimates of the portfolio diversification of the largest shareholder in a firm to study the impact of shareholder diversification on the firm. For firms where the controlling shareholder is an individual, our tests indicate that the owner-managers use debt, dual class shares and corporate control transactions (merger activity) to strategically trade off corporate control and the drawback of poor portfolio diversification. However, for firms where the controlling shareholder is an institution, our results indicate that control but not diversification is important.     

Mutual supervision or conspiracy? The incentive effect of multiple large shareholders on audit quality requirements

Multiple large shareholders may choose to mutual supervise or conspire, thereby affecting the firm's strategy and transactional operations. This paper examines the impact of firms with multiple large shareholders on demand for high-quality audits. Compared with firms with a single large shareholder, firms with multiple large shareholders increase audit cost and increase the probability of hiring a Big Four accounting firm. After a series of robustness checks, this result holds. Furthermore, we find that the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder tends to increase audit cost and increase the probability of hiring the Big Four. The absolute controlling and non-controlling shareholders tend to increase audit cost and increase the probability of hiring the Big Four. The state-owned firms and large firms with multiple large shareholders tend to increase audit cost and increase the probability of hiring the Big Four. This paper helps to enrich the research on external audit supervision and moral hazard research from the perspective of ownership structure.     

Shareholder activism and firms’ performance

Increasing attention to activist campaigns raises the question of whether they lead to better performance. The impact of different motives, demands, and proposals is still unclear and, sometimes, contradictory. We used a unique dataset of activist campaigns targeting firms in the US from 2002 to 2017 and analysed the impact of activism on firm performance, considering their specific demands. Our results show that firms experience a decline in profitability almost immediately after campaigns, although the effect is unclear in the years subsequent to the intervention. Results also suggest that campaigns primarily focused on demanding a change in strategic direction or obtaining board control intensify the decline in profitability. Seeking board representation is the type of demand that effectively increases target firms’ profitability. Our analysis adds to research on shareholder governance and competitive dynamics by highlighting that the type of demand adopted in campaigns impacts differently on firms’ performance.