控制权私有收益的量化研究

一、引言现代金融学理论基础之一是分散化,投资者可以通过组合投资来分散风险,为什么投资者会放弃分散风险的利益,而把财富都集中在一种股票上呢?两大因素影响了这种现象的产生,即控制权的共享利益和私有利益。当控制权集中在大股东手中时,由于占有企业利益的大部分,他们比控制权分散在很多投资者手中时更容易采取一致的行动,大股东有动力去搜集企业的信息和监督管理,从而可以避免搭便车的问题。由于大股东普遍关心利润最大化并拥有足够多的控制权,所以它能解决代理问题。随着持股比例的上升,控股股东更有动力来提高公司的价值,由此而产生的更多现金流能同所有股东共享,这就产生了控制权共享利益。但股权集中同时也带来另一种代理问题,即大股东和小股东的代理问题,控股股东的利益和小股东的利益并不一致,两者之间经常出现严重的利益冲突。在缺乏外部监督或者外部股东分散化的情况下,控股股东可能以其他股东的利益为代价来追求自身利益,不但强烈的谋取私有利益,而且侵占公司的资源或谋取其它股东无法获得的利益,这样就导致了控制权私有利益的产生。本文以2005年深沪两地上市公司发生的国有股转让事件为样本计算控制权私有收益,这样,样本中包含了转让比例很小的事件,可能会低估...     

合理掏空动机、超额掏空动机与控制权私有收益

以2004—2007年我国上市公司为样本,实证研究结果发现：（1）控股股东的”合理掏空动机”与”超额掏空动机”伴随着现金流权的上升呈现的是一种此消彼长的关系,而这两类动机都会引致控股股东对于控制权私有收益的追逐,但是二者的作用机理却是完全不同的;（2）伴随着现金流权的影响,控股股东的”超额掏空动机”之于控制权私有收益的正向效应和”合理掏空动机”之于控制权私有收益的负向效应的综合作用结果是不同的。     

大股东控制权收益的分享与控制机制研究

大股东控制企业一方面有助于降低股东与经营者之间的代理成本,提高公司价值,另一方面也伴随着大股东对中小股东利益的掠夺。相应地,公司的控制权收益可以分为共享收益和私有收益两大部分。为限制控股股东对中小股东利益的掠夺,应当建立起激励相容的大股东与中小股东对控制权共享收益的分享机制,增加大股东对共享收益的分享份额,同时,通过完善独立董事制度、审计委员会制度、强化对大股东行为的法律约束机制等措施控制大股东对公司的掏空行为。     

控制权私有收益影响因素研究综述

目前全球大多数公司都采用集中所有权的股权结构,这一结构易使得控股股东攫取控制权私有收益。因此为抑制控制权私有收益的攫取,保护公司相关者,促进公司的积极发展,明确影响控制权私有收益的因素便显得十分重要。本文通过对研究影响控制权私有收益因素研究的梳理,发现了影响控制权私利的三大因素,并对此进行总结。     

控股股东与盈余质量——基于盈余反应系数的考察

在我国目前的经济环境下,企业的股权结构,特别是控股股东的大量存在是造成盈余质量不高的一个重要原因。基于这种考虑,我们调整了盈余反应系数基本模型,加入与控股股东有关的研究变量,使用我国上市公司1999～2002年间的经验数据加以分析,结果表明:控股股东的持股比例与企业的盈余质量显著负相关;控股股东为国有股时盈余质量更低;其他股东的制衡能力越强盈余质量越高。最后据此提出了有关建议。     

关联交易、线下项目与盈余管理——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

近年来,关联交易盈余管理愈演愈烈,极大地损害了投资者的利益。以往大量研究提供了上市公司操纵应计项目及线下项目进行盈余管理的证据,本文则以中国上市公司2002--2004年的面板数据为研究样本,首次大样本检验关联交易、线下项目与盈余管理的关系。本文的主要结论包括：（1）有配股盈余管理动机的公司的第一类关联交易（通常计入线上项目的关联交易）比例显著高于控制样本,第三类关联交易（担保抵押类关联交易）比例显著低于控制样本。（2）有避亏盈余管理动机的公司的第二类关联交易（通常计入线下项目的关联交易）比例显著高于控制样本。（3）有盈余管理动机的公司,当其附属企业集团时,或者其控股股东处于绝对控股地位时,其关联交易比例更高。（4）第一类关联交易与线下项目显著负相关,有盈余管理动机的公司,线下项目较低时第一类关联交易比例较高。（5）配股公司配股后的关联销售和关联采购比例显著低于配股前。扭亏为盈的公司扭亏当年的第二类关联交易比例显著高于扭亏前一年。综上所述,计入线上项目的关联交易是上市公司为获取配股资格而进盈余管理的重要手段,计入线下项目的关联交易是上市公司为避免亏损而进行盈余管理的重要手段;上市公司控股股东处于绝对控股地位时,或控股股东隶属某一企业集团时,关联交易盈余管理行为更严重;进行盈余管理时,线下项目与计入线上项目的关联交易具有替代性。     

机构投资者独立性对代理成本的影响

本文以2006~2009年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,在根据投资目标对机构投资者进行类型划分的基础上,探讨了机构投资者独立性对代理成本的影响。研究发现,独立机构持股比例越高,公司管理层代理成本和控股股东代理成本越低,而非独立机构持股对两类代理成本影响有限。在进一步考虑了控股股东持股比例的影响后,发现独立机构持股在控股股东偏好控制权私有收益的情况下更能降低管理层代理成本,表明在此情况下,独立机构对管理层自利行为有更大的监督作用。     

股权结构能否影响控制权转移后企业治理效率的变化?

本文从控制权转移的动态过程中考察了股权特征因素对控制权交易后公司绩效改善的作用。文章利用1997￣2003年总共249个第一大股东变更的上市公司样本,通过wilcoxon检验等方法证明了控股程度不同的企业在控制权转移前存在显著的业绩差异,而控制权交易引起的股权集中度程度及控股股东持股份额的变化能够引起交易后企业业绩的变化,然而控股股东属性与企业业绩改善的关系并不显著,无证据表明法人股接管控制权后能够改善企业的治理效率。本文的论证在一定程度上肯定了我国控制权市场的外部治理效力。     

股权结构能否影响控制权转移后企业治理效率的变化？

本文从控制权转移的动态过程中考察了股权特征因素对控制权交易后公司绩效改善的作用。文章利用1997-2003年总共249个第一大股东变更的上市公司样本，通过wilcoxon检验等方法证明了控股程度不同的企业在控制权转移前存在显著的业绩差异，而控制权交易引起的股权集中度程度及控股股东持股份额的变化能够引起交易后企业业绩的变化，然而控股股东属性与企业业绩改善的关系并不显著，无证据表明法人股接管控制权后能够改善企业的治理效率。本文的论证在一定程度上肯定了我国控制权市场的外部治理效力．     

上市公司关联方交易盈余管理与关联方利益转移关系研究

本文选取了2001—2004年147家因关联交易获得非标准审计意见的上市公司作为样本,建立模型实证上市公司关联交易盈余管理与关联方利益转移的关系。发现关联交易盈余管理的主要目的和结果是关联方从上市公司转移利益;股权集中度与关联方利益转移的关系较为复杂;资产规模越大关联方利益转移的程度越高。政策建议为:限制金字塔多层持股和交叉多重持股,而不是简单地降低股权集中度;在股权分置改革时实行国有股缩股而不是只向流通股股东送股;实行累退投票制度;对股东大会决议的最低股权数做出决定;实行控股股东的债权劣后受偿制度。     

Multiple blockholders and earnings management

This paper examines the impact of multiple blockholders on earnings management when the main conflict of interest is between controlling shareholder and other shareholders. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2000 to 2017 and controlling for potential sample selection and endogeneity, we find that firms with multiple blockholders tend to have higher earnings management than firms with a single controlling shareholder. The positive impact of multiple blockholders on earnings management is more pronounced when those blockholders are the same type – state or private. Earnings management is also enhanced with more large shareholders and higher relative ownership of other large shareholders to the controlling shareholder. The results are consistent with the cost-sharing hypothesis, where the other large shareholders shoulder the costs of earnings management with the controlling shareholder proportionally, but not the private benefits of control. Further tests show that the positive relation between multiple large shareholders and earnings management is less pronounced in firms with stronger internal or external governance. Overall, our paper demonstrates a potential dark side of multiple blockholders from the angle of financial reporting quality.     

Private Benefits of Control, Ownership, and the Cross-listing Decision

This paper investigates how a foreign firm's decision to cross-list on a U.S. stock exchange is related to the consumption of private benefits of control by its controlling shareholders. Theory has proposed that when private benefits are high, controlling shareholders are less likely to choose to cross-list in the United States because of constraints on the consumption of private benefits resulting from such listings. Using several proxies for private benefits related to the control and cash flow ownership rights of controlling shareholders, we find support for this hypothesis with a sample of more than 4,000 firms from 31 countries.     

Controlling shareholder,expropriations and firm's leverage decision: Evidence from Chinese Non-tradable share reform

This paper examines the effect of excess control rights on the leverage decisions made by Chinese non-SOEs before and after the Non-tradable share reform (NTS reform). We find that firms with excess control rights have more excess leverage and their controlling shareholders use the resources for tunneling rather than investing in positive NPV projects. We also find that excess leverage in firms with excess control rights decreases and the market reaction to announcements of related party transactions are more positive after NTS reform. This confirms that tunneling by the controlling shareholders actually reduced. We argue that in emerging markets where legal protection for creditors and shareholders is weak, controlling shareholders borrow excess debt to tunnel through inter-corporate loans and related party transactions. Furthermore the privatization of these economies can reduce the controlling shareholders' tunneling activities and associated excess leverage which destroys firm value.     

反哺还是机会主义利己? ——对IPO阶段企业控股股东支持性关联交易的研究

选取2001-2019年A股IPO企业为研究样本,运用回归分析检验IPO阶段企业控股股东支持性关联交易的性质.研究结果显示,IPO前企业控股股东的支持性关联交易行为并不是着眼于企业长期发展的反哺,而是控股股东的短期机会主义利己行为.同时,盈利水平差、融资约束严重及外部市场法治化程度低的企业控股股东倾向于采用支持性关联交易"反哺"企业,而信息不对称程度并不影响"反哺"决策.进一步分析表明,控股股东更倾向于采取担保类和销售类支持性关联交易,且更倾向于在IPO前一年对上市企业提供爆发式的支持.     

金字塔控制、关联交易与公司价值——基于我国民营上市公司的实证研究

本文以我国证券市场2002～2004年329家民营上市公司为样本，考察了金字塔控制、关联交易与公司价值之间的关系。发现民营上市公司的金字塔控制不利干公司价值：民营上市公司的最终控制人主要通过关联方担保、关联方资金占用和上市公司与关联方的商品购销活动来侵占小股东的利益，其政策含义是应该鼓励自然人直接持股上市公司，加强对关联交易的监管。更为重要的是必须改营公司外部治理环境、尤其是法律对投资者权益的保护，从而从根本上杜绝民营上市公司及其最终控制人对小股东的侵害行为，改善公司治理，提高公司价值。     

Tunneling and propping up: An analysis of related party transactions by Chinese listed companies

We examine a sample of related party transactions between Chinese publicly listed firms and their controlling shareholders during 2001–2002. Minority shareholders in these firms seem to be subject to expropriation through tunneling but also gain from propping up. On balance, there seems to be more tunneling than propping up. Both types of firms have larger state ownership compared to the rest of the Chinese market but firms that are propped up are larger and have larger state ownership than firms subject to tunneling. Propped up firms are more likely to have foreign shareholders and to be cross-listed abroad compared to firms that are subject to tunneling. Propped up firms also tend to have worse operating performance in the fiscal year preceding the announcement of the related party transaction. Finally, we find that related party transactions representing tunneling are accompanied by significantly less information disclosure compared to related party transactions representing propping.     

Controlling shareholders and corporate value: Evidence from Thailand

This study investigates the effects of controlling shareholders on corporate performance. The empirical results, based on a unique database of Thai firms, do not support the hypothesis that controlling shareholders expropriate corporate assets. In fact, the presence of controlling shareholders is associated with higher performance, when measured by accounting measures such as the ROA and the sales–asset ratio. Since most of the firms do not implement control mechanisms to separate voting and cash flow rights, the controlling shareholders might be self-constrained not to extract private benefits. Otherwise, they would internalize higher costs of expropriation from holding high stakes. The controlling shareholders' involvement in the management, however, has a negative effect on the performance. The negative effect is more pronounced when the controlling shareholder-and-manager's ownership is at the 25–50%. The evidence also reveals that family-controlled firms display significantly higher performance. Foreign controlled firms as well as firms with more than one controlling shareholder also have higher ROA, relative to firms with no controlling shareholder.     

Earnings Management in Business Groups: Tax Incentives or Expropriation Concealment?

This study provides evidence that Belgian firms affiliated to a business group (holding) manage their earnings more than stand-alone firms. Earnings management is especially more prevalent in fully owned group firms compared to group firms with minority shareholders. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that controlling shareholders face fewer constraints to manage earnings if opportunistic earnings management cannot adversely affect the value of minority shareholders and is inconsistent with the claim that group firms would engage in earnings management to hide controlling shareholders' self-serving transactions. On the incentive part, we find that group firms strategically manage earnings in response to tax incentives. More specifically, we show that signed discretionary accruals of group firms depend significantly more on the marginal tax rate status of the firm as compared to independent firms. Finally, we document that earnings management is particularly facilitated through intra-group transactions.     

Not All Related Party Transactions (RPTs) Are the Same: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post RPTs

Related party transactions (RPTs) are potential means for insiders to expropriate outside shareholders via self‐dealing. There are, however, possible benefits to these arrangements for outside shareholders. We find that the overall volume of disclosed RPTs is generally not significantly associated with shareholder wealth as measured by operating profitability or Tobin's Q. However, the results for total RPT volume obscure that ex ante RPTs, transactions that predate a counterparty becoming a related party, are innocuous at worst in terms of their association with operating profitability and significantly positively associated with Tobin's Q whereas ex post RPTs, transactions initiated after a counterparty becomes a related party, are significantly negatively associated with operating profitability. Ex post RPTs also result in significant share price declines when first disclosed and are associated with an increased likelihood that a firm will enter financial distress or deregister its securities. These results are consistent with ex post RPTs serving as means for insiders to expropriate outside shareholders.