预算机会主义、预算治理构造和预算审计——国家审计嵌入公共预算的理论架构

各国的国家审计在公共预算中的作用呈现不同特色.沿着预算机会主义、预算治理构造到预算审计这个逻辑路径,建立一个关于国家审计在公共预算中作用的理论架构,并以美国和中国作为案例来验证这个理论构架,具有重要意义.各个国家针对预算机会主义会有一个由预算文化、预算制衡和预算问责组成的预算治理构造,预算审计属于预算问责,预算审计如何嵌入预算治理构造的决定因素是剩余预算机会主义,剩余机会主义决定预算审计体制、预算审计重点和预算审计模式.     

网络外部性、专用性投资与机会主义行为——双边锁定与关系持续

机会主义行为是营销研究核心问题之一。文章通过模型分析表明,渠道购买商网络外部性引起的正反馈循环会使销售商被"锁定",这种被"锁定"的专用性投资进而会导致购买商攫取"准租"的机会主义行为,不考虑关系持续和双边锁定,实证研究验证了模型结论。但渠道双方都发生专用性投资时,机会主义行为会受到限制;另外,渠道关系期限也有效地缓解专用性投资"锁定"导致的机会主义行为。     

Are joint venture partners more opportunistic in a more volatile environment?

This study examines how joint venture partners' opportunism is influenced by environmental volatility in a drastically changing emerging economy. Building on transaction cost and information‐processing theories, we develop the hypothesis that opportunism increases to cope with industry structural instability, information unverifiability, and law unenforceability, the three interrelated yet distinct characteristics that jointly describe environmental volatility in an emerging economy. Our analysis of 188 foreign joint ventures in an emerging market suggests that opportunism increases with information unverifiability and law unenforceability. These relationships are even stronger when joint ventures depend more on the host country environment, but weaker when joint ventures operate in faster‐growing industries. Finally, opportunism is found to play a mediating role in the relationship between environmental volatility and joint venture performance. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Role of Ownership in Managing Interfirm Opportunism: A Dyadic Study

We extend research on transaction cost theory that shows that vertical integration enables firms to protect their investments in exchange relationships better than market mechanisms. However, extant research finds ownership to exacerbate, rather than limit, exchange partner opportunism. Hence, the purpose of this study is to investigate conditions under which ownership can be effective for constraining an exchange partner's opportunism. Using matched dyadic data for 296 hotel brands, we conduct multi-level hierarchical linear modeling and identify conditions under which common ownership limits hotel opportunism. Findings indicate that ownership can limit hotel opportunism when brand headquarters can easily monitor the hotel's activities.     

新制度经济学视角下保险理赔难的原因与对策研究

保险理赔难近年已经成为消费者投诉的一个重点,制约中国保险业健康发展。通过使用制度经济学的方法,分析其原因主要就是理赔制度的不完善和监督制度的低效率。通过完善保险理赔和保险公估制度,建立全国信用征信体系等措施,有助于解决理赔难的问题,促进保险业的健康发展。     

Concurrent sourcing,governance mechanisms,and performance outcomes in industrial value chains

We examine transaction governance in the context of concurrent sourcing, where a manufacturer relies on sourcing from external suppliers and in‐house production simultaneously. Our focus is on (1) a buyer's use of particular safeguards or governance mechanisms vis‐à‐vis an external supplier and (2) how the effects of these mechanisms on various performance outcomes are influenced by the joint presence of an internal manufacturing branch. We conduct two studies in the apparel industry and show that performance outcomes are a joint function of (1) the individual governance mechanisms that are deployed in a particular relationship and (2) the larger sourcing context (concurrent or singular). Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

我国上市公司治理与会计政策选择

会计政策选择受到公司治理的强烈影响,其存在有一定的客观必然性。文章论述了两种主要公司模式下会计政策选择的取向,分析了我国上市公司治理的现状及由此而产生的会计政策选择方面的问题。为提高会计政策选择的效率性,我国上市公司应完善公司治理结构,文章对此提出了建议。     

Investment in private water development: Property rights and contractual opportunism during the California Gold Rush

This paper explores the development of water supplies by private ditch companies during the California Gold Rush. Using data taken from newspaper stories, mining camp by-laws, and state Supreme Court and district court cases, the paper documents the presence of institutional conditions that were unfavorable to support private water investments including property rights uncertainty, imperfect capital markets, and significant contractual enforcement costs that may have provided opportunities for contractual holdup by miners. Some evidence suggests that water development was likely discouraged to some extent. Nevertheless, the larger response was a major expansion in water supplies through an extensive ditch system, suggesting that there were factors that limited the ability of miners to capture rents, including various ditch company strategies to limit their exposure to opportunistic behavior and recognition by miners of their reliance on ditch companies.     

Staging of Venture Financing, Investor Opportunism and Patent Law

Abstract:  Stage financing provides a real option that is valuable when facing external uncertainty. However, it may also induce investor hold-up, if the property rights on an invention are not sufficiently protected. As a consequence, the entrepreneur may not work hard. Investor opportunism is less likely to occur, if investors' residual cash-flow-rights are contingent on verifiable 'milestones' in the previous stage. Equity-linked financing also provides high-powered incentives to the investor not to 'steal the idea' because his payoff becomes sensitive to the project value. The paper provides a new explanation for both types of contractual provisions.     

Board governance and corporate performance

We examine the link between the monitoring capacity of the board and corporate performance of UK listed firms. We also investigate how firms use the flexibility offered by the voluntary governance regime to make governance choices. We find a strong positive association between the board governance index we construct and firm operating performance. Our results imply that adherence to the board‐related recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance Code strengthens the board's monitoring capacity, potentially helping mitigate agency problems, but that investors do not value it correspondingly. Moreover, in contrast to prior UK findings suggesting efficient adoption of Code recommendations, we find that firms at times use the Code flexibility opportunistically, aiming to decrease the monitoring capacity of the board, which is followed by subsequent underperformance. This finding questions the effectiveness of the voluntary approach to governance regulation followed in the UK and in many countries around the world.