货币政策、企业家信心与上市公司投资效率*

企业、企业家等微观主体对货币政策的反应，在较大程度上影响货币政策的效果。货币政策可通过对企业家信心的影响，进而对公司投资效率产生作用。基于中国2007—2016年40个季度A股上市公司样本的实证研究表明：企业家信心在货币政策传导过程中有不可忽视的作用。企业家信心增强或者货币政策宽松时会加剧过度投资，减轻投资不足；企业家信心减弱或者货币政策紧缩时可以有效抑制过度投资，但会加剧投资不足。其中，国有企业对企业家信心和货币政策松紧的敏感性更强。进一步，货币政策对企业投资效率的影响，也会通过货币政策和企业家信心的交互作用而发挥作用。这种作用在国有企业和非国有企业之间无显著差异。     

Death spiral PIPEs: a reconsideration of the evidence

We challenge the view that PIPEs lead to unfavourable outcomes for issuing firms. We show that structured PIPEs do not have significant negative CARs when a matched firm benchmark is used for computing CARs and when sample selection bias is taken into account. Indeed, structured PIPEs have significantly higher positive skewness, indicating superior optionality, consistent with the real option argument. We also show that the 2002 intervention by the Securities and Exchange Corporation (SEC) has led to unintended consequences, with the substitution of ‘mom and pop’ investors for hedge fund investors in the structured PIPE market.     

基于DEA-SBM模型的中国地板上市企业环境效率研究

考虑非期望产出,基于企业层面,根据2011-2016年数据,采用DEA-SBM模型与DEA-CCR模型对中国12家地板上市公司的环境效率与经济效率进行测算与比较。结果表明:2016年环境效率和经济效率测算结果显示不同地板上市企业运行效率存在差别;与经济效率相比,一些企业如北新建材、扬子地板,环境效率保持不变,一些企业如宜华生活、吉林森工和丰林集团,环境效率得到提升;还有一些企业如兔宝宝、升达林业和大自然家居等,环境效率则出现下降。考虑了非期望产出,中国地板上市企业整体环境效率均值低于经济效率均值,总体处于0.79~0.84之间。提出了政府应加强监管力度,地板上市企业应提高技术改进能力,建立完善社会责任信息披露机制的建议。     

Private benefits from control block trades in the Spanish stock exchange

A control block trade can be explained by the expectation of financial gains, shared by all shareholders, or by the expectation of private benefits, exclusive to the buyer and possibly at the expense of other shareholders’ rents. The market for corporate control contributes to social welfare when it improves the efficiency of the allocation of resources. When the objective of a block transaction is private benefits, social welfare may be negatively impacted as minority shareholders could withdraw from the market. Therefore the estimation of private benefits would allow the efficiency of the market for corporate control to be assessed. Specifically, the aim of this paper is to calculate private benefits in the Spanish market for partial control. Using a sample of partial control transactions over the period 1990–2016, we find that the median of private benefits is negative, therefore it appears that there is no inefficient use of resources in the Spanish partial control market as a whole, however private costs are detected. The variability of private benefits is explained in a significant way by variables related to the control structure of the target firm, such as the controlling position of the buyer after the transaction, the contestability of control and the cross-shareholdings between the buyer and large shareholders. Performance and the size of the firm are significant as well.     

Can stable environmental protection officials’ tenure reduce illegal emissions?

Based on the day-night PM_2.5 difference of the nearest atmospheric monitoring points to measure whether there is illegal emission, this paper explores the impact of environmental protection officials' tenure (EPLT) on illegal emissions. The results show that there is a positive correlation between EPLT and illegal emissions. Stable EPLT can reduce illegal emissions by increasing environmental information disclosure and environmental subsidies. It can increase illegal emissions by weakening public pollution reporting and media supervision, environmental law enforcement and promoting corruption. In addition, EPLT can increase illegal emissions as EPLT is less than 3.55 years, while EPLT can increase illegal emissions as EPLT exceeds 6.21 years. Further, when mayor's tenure and EPLT are both stable, the promotion effect of EPLT on illegal emission is stronger. Stable company director's tenure can also aggravate the promotion effect of EPLT on illegal emissions.     

结构性违约、信用分层与评级机构的策略性反应——来自中国信用债市场的证据

2014年以来，以主要集中于民企的"结构性违约"宣告了中国信用债市场刚性兑付的"结构性打破"，债券市场进入了新的发展阶段。利用2013-2017年债券数据，本文深入分析了结构性违约对评级机构行为和效率的影响，主要有如下发现：首先，信用评级的市场公信力会因政府隐性担保导致的"刚性兑付"而削弱；其次，结构性违约爆发之后，信用评级的整体效率有所提升，但在不同发行主体呈现分化，对于非城投类企业，信用评级对发行利差的影响显著增大，意味着评级公信力的显著提升，而对于城投类企业，评级效率并未明显改善；进一步研究表明，出现这种情况的原因在于评级机构在违约后采取了差异化的评级策略，对于违约风险较大的非城投类债券，评级机构倾向采取"收紧评级"的策略；对于违约风险较低的城投债，评级机构倾向于采取"放宽评级"的策略。这种策略性行为是导致市场"信用分层"的重要原因，并有可能推升民营企业的融资成本。     

Ownership discrimination and private firms financing in China

This study examines the financing/funding of private firms in China. Our results show that private firms are significantly less funded through formal financing channels such as bank loans than state-owned firms, and hence have to resort to alternative financing such as trade credit. Consistent with the theoretical expectation and literature, there is a substitution effect between trade credit and bank loans for private firms, but this effect is much weaker compared to that of state-owned firms. Moreover, while the univariate comparisons indicate that private firms obtain more notes payable than state-owned firms, the multivariate regression analyses show that the relation between bank loan and notes payable is positive and indifferent between private and state-owned firms.     

工业体系和民营企业兴起——基于252家中国最大民营制造业企业的经验研究

主流经济学家把改革开放后民营企业的大规模兴起，主要归因为市场经济条件下发挥企业家精神和遵循比较优势的必然结果。但是这无法解释为什么民营企业在兴起之初就广泛和快速地进入到各个工业，尤其是技术和资本密集型工业。基于中国工业史和252家中国最大民营制造业企业创业发展史的历史证据，文章找回"工业体系"这一被主流所忽略的重大历史现象和学术概念，从而首次提出一种理解中国民营企业发展独特性的结构性解释。文章发现：从计划经济时期继承而来的门类齐全和独立完整的工业体系，是解释民营企业创业和发展独特性的关键变量；已有的由国有企业和科研院所组成的工业体系，从市场机会、技术能力和组织资源等方面塑造了民营企业的创业选择和发展路径。所以，中国民营企业的快速发展不是仅凭自由市场就会自动出现的普遍现象，而是在市场条件下充分利用工业体系提供的技术和市场条件才得以出现的特殊现象。     

Separation of ownership and control for Chinese listed firms: Effect on the cost of debt and the moderating role of bank competition

This research investigates the effect of the separation between firm ownership and control on the cost of debt, with attention to the moderating role of state ownership and bank competition. We make use of a sample of 1744 Chinese A-share firms for the years 2011–2017. We find that separation between ownership and control is positively associated with the cost of debt. This is consistent with the view that separation of control from ownership allows controlling shareholders to engage in tunneling and other behaviors that increase the risk of default. State ownership weakens this positive link because government debt guarantees mitigate the risk of default. Greater competition in the banking industry generally reduces the cost of debt for non-state enterprises while having no effect for state enterprises. At the same time, greater bank competition amplifies the positive effect of ownership and control separation on debt cost for non-state enterprises as banks must still cover the higher default risk. Finally, the global financial crisis raised the cost of debt for non-state enterprises but had no effect for state enterprises.     

The funding of subsidiaries equity,double leverage and the risk of bank holding companies

Banking groups exploit double leverage when ‘debt is issued by the parent company and the proceeds are invested in subsidiaries as equity’. Financial authorities have frequently raised concerns about the issue of double leverage because this type of intra‐firm financing appears to allow for both the arbitrage of capital and the assumption of risk. This article focuses on the relationship between double leverage and risk‐taking within banking groups. First, we discuss this relationship based on an examination of balance sheet figures. Second, we analyze a large sample of United States Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) from 1990–2014. The results show that BHCs are more prone to risk when they increase their double leverage, namely, when the stake of the parent within subsidiaries is larger than the stand‐alone capital of the parent. This paper's primary implication for policymakers is that the regulators of complex financial entities should more efficiently address the issue of double leverage, thereby limiting the potential negative consequences that arise from corporate instability.